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SWAPPING AMNESTY FOR PEACE AND THE DUTY
TO PROSECUTE HUMAN RIGHTS CRIMES
Diane F. Orentlicher *
I am fortunate to have as a foundation for my remarks Professor
Roht-Arriaza's lucid presentation of the principal sources of international
law bearing on amnesties for gross violations of human rights. My own,
remarks will address the policy dimension of such amnesties, focusing on
their implications for peace in countries that are tenuously emerging from
brutal conflict.
First, however, I would like to note that, in respect of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, there is an additional source of legal obligation bearing on
the question of punishment beyond those found in general international
law. The Security Council resolution establishing the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia requires all states that are
members of the United Nations to cooperate fully with the Tribunal,
including its orders of arrest and requests for assistance. That obligation
was reiterated in the Dayton peace agreement with respect to the parties to
that accord.
Turning to the subject of my remarks: "Do amnesties represent
sound policy?" The answer can only be, "It depends." Those who claim
to have a universally relevant answer to this question surely overreach the
limits of human knowledge. Still, I would offer several general
observations respecting the wisdom of amnesties for gross violations of
human rights.
First, one ought to be skeptical of claims that a wholesale amnesty
is the approach most likely to facilitate national reconciliation, even while
being open to persuasion on this point. All too often, the term
"reconciliation" has been used as a code-word for impunity when invoked
as a justification for amnesties. In fact, however, punishment may be an
essential foundation for reconciliation, as Hannah Arendt suggested when
she wrote: Men cannot forgive what they cannot punish.
More generally, when the decision is too easily made in the
direction of overlooking crimes of the past in the service of national
reconciliation, the costs, both morally and socially, are high.
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Finally, I believe that we would do well to resist the tendency to
address the wisdom of amnesties in terms of stark dichotomies, such as
"punish or pardon" and "amnesty or accountability". These dichotomies
present unduly narrow options, detracting from more constructive efforts
to balance the demands of justice against those of reconciliation and,
ultimately, to promote reconciliation within a framework of accountability.
A model of such an approach is that which has been undertaken by
the government of South Africa. Under that country's law, individuals
must confess fully to their crimes in order to receive an amnesty. Even
then, an amnesty committee may deny the petitioner's request if the
committee deems his crime disproportionate to its political objective.
Although it remains to be seen how this approach will play out, it may
well have the effect of fostering a fuller accounting of the truth behind
apartheid's grim litany of crimes, as well as a more robust record of
prosecution, than has been possible in other countries that have endured
crimes against the human condition.
The possibility of receiving an amnesty provides an inducement for
those who participated in apartheid-era depredations to disclose
information about those crimes, thereby facilitating full disclosure of the
truth. These disclosures may, in turn, facilitate successful prosecutions of
persons implicated by the confessors. In this respect, the South African
approach establishes a dynamic relationship between the truth - and
justice - seeking dimensions of accountability, while breaking out of the
sterile dichotomy ("punish or pardon") that has too long framed
international debate about how nations should address their legacies of
brutal governance.
I will devote the rest of my remarks to another country - Bosnia
and Herzegovina - because decisions made in the months ahead will have
truly critical implications there. Further, policy determinations respecting
the crimes that raged across Bosnia during its recent conflict have been,
and will continue to be, almost peculiarly the province of the international
community.
That policy is one of professed commitment to accountability but,
for the most part, has emerged in the past year as a policy of de facto
impunity.
The official policy is embodied in the Security Council's
establishment of the first international criminal tribunal since Nuremberg
and Tokyo. The Hague Tribunal was created to prosecute those
responsible for serious violations of humanitarian law committed during
the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. As I noted earlier, the Security
Council resolution establishing the Tribunal imposes an obligation on all
states that are members of the United Nations to cooperate with the
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Tribunal. Further, the governments of Yugoslavia, Bosnia, and Croatia
reiterated their commitment to cooperate fully with the Tribunal when they
ratified the Dayton peace agreement. The Dayton accords also authorize,
but do not require, the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) to arrest
suspects indicted by the Tribunal.
The very establishment of the Tribunal speaks volumes about the
subject of this panel. Above all, this measure was a powerful tribute to the
role of justice in securing peace. Notably, the Tribunal was established as
a peace enforcement measure under Chapter VII of the United Nations
Charter. The Council determined that the work of the Tribunal would help
ensure an end to the crimes known as "ethnic cleansing", and would
"contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace" in the war-
ravaged territory of the former Yugoslavia.
Notably, too, the provisions in the Dayton accords requiring
parties to cooperate with the Tribunal upended the conventional wisdom
about the need and desirability of "swapping amnesty for peace." It had
been widely predicted that such a deal would be inevitable if the parties to
the Balkan conflict were to reach a peace agreement. Instead, the accords
affirmed the important role that the Tribunal would play in assuring lasting
peace in Bosnia.
Further, it is widely acknowledged that the Dayton peace accords
would not even have been possible had the Tribunal not already indicted
two men who bear principal responsibility for "ethnic cleansing": General
Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic. Before his indictment, when
Karadzic headed the Bosnian Serb delegation to United Nations-sponsored
peace conferences, no success was possible. Far from hindering peace
prospects, then, the Tribunal played a central part in clearing the way to
Dayton.
But if Dayton avows that legal process is a keystone of lasting
peace in Bosnia, implementation efforts have thus far defied Dayton's
clarion call for justice. Among the authorities in the former Yugoslavia in
a position to arrest war criminals, only the Bosnian government has
complied fully with this obligation (though it too may have breached its
duty to cooperate fully with the Tribunal by allegedly putting forth false
testimony, thereby forcing prosecutors in The Hague to retract the
testimony of one witness in the trial of Dusko Tadic). Of seventy-four
suspects indicted by the Tribunal, only seven are in its custody.
Dario Kordic, the most senior Croat official indicted by the
Tribunal, reportedly lives in a government-owned apartment in Zagreb.
Since his indictment, he has been seen sitting in the row behind Croatian
President Franjo Tudjman at a public concert. Another Croat indicted by
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the Tribunal, Ivica Rajic, reportedly lived for almost a year in a hotel
owned by the Croatian Defense Ministry.
This week, it was reported that four Bosnian Serbs indicted by the
Tribunal have been working openly as police officers in Prijedor and
Omarska, cities indelibly linked with images of "ethnic cleansing".
Yesterday, the Boston Globe reported that two other Bosnian Serbs
indicted by the Tribunal were working as public officials in Bosanski
Samac, one as the highest-ranking municipal official, and the other in the
local office of Bosnian Serb state security.
For its part IFOR has made a shameful mockery of its professed
policy to arrest suspects indicted by the Hague Tribunal if they are
"encountered". One United States commander asserted that his troops
would arrest suspects like Radovan Karadzic only if they literally stumble
into an IFOR checkpoint. In fact, the record suggests that IFOR would not
even arrest indicted suspects under these circumstances. In August, when
IFOR inspectors learned that General Ratko Mladic was inside a bunker
they had planned to inspect, they rescheduled their visit rather than
confront the indicted war criminal within.
Two days before the September elections in Bosnia, the United
States Commander of IFOR, Admiral Joseph Lopez, met with Serb
officials in the headquarters of Radovan Karadzic, who, according to Serb
sources, was almost certainly inside the building. And in a virtuoso
display of IFOR's talent for not "stumbling into" Mladic or Karadzic,
none of the 53,000 IFOR troops deployed to provide security on election
day in mid-September had an arrest-worthy encounter with these men,
although both reportedly turned out to vote.
The costs of this policy have been evident in each grim dateline
from Bosnia, and the principal casualty has been the Dayton peace
process. Emboldened by IFOR's repeatedly avowed resolve not to arrest
him, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic has undermined virtually
every major non-military provision of the Dayton accords. The first
significant test came last February, when Serb-held neighborhoods in
Sarajevo were transferred to the authority of the Bosnian Government.
Coming in the early months of the peace, this transfer could have been a
harbinger of reconciliation in the best spirit of Dayton. Instead, heeding
the calls of Karadzic, Serbs abandoned these neighborhoods rather than
live with returning Muslims-and torched their homes as they left.
More recently, negotiated out of public office but not political
influence, Karadzic derailed the possibility of a credible voter registration
process, a fact that led to the postponement of municipal elections that had
been slated to be held in mid-September, but not to the postponement of
national elections. Humanitarian aid programs administered in Serb-held
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areas of Bosnia by Karadzic's wife, for example, were flagrantly
manipulated to secure a Serb victory that would ratify the results of ethnic
cleansing. To qualify for aid packages, displaced Serbs reportedly had to
agree to register in certain key locations. In this setting, the elections
effectively ratified ethnic cleansing, bringing into office hard-line
nationalists who openly oppose inter-ethnic cooperation.
Above all, Srebrenica, where thousands of Muslims were
slaughtered by Serb forces last summer, stands as a tragic monument to the
folly of letting Mladic and Karadzic remain at large. The largest massacre
in Europe since World War II, this happened under the supervision of men
who had already been indicted by the Tribunal. That it occurred before
the Dayton accords were signed does not affect the grim reality that if any
semblance of the rule of law had been enforceable only last year, an
odious crime could have been avoided.
Finally, the costs of this de facto impunity include an intangible,
but potentially serious, erosion of the Hague Tribunal's authority. Just as
the craven acquiescence in "ethnic cleansing" by the United Nations
Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia deeply compromised the
credibility of the United Nations, a continuing failure to secure the arrest
of suspects indicted by the Hague Tribunal will surely diminish its hard-
earned credibility and its ability to advance national healing in Bosnia.
Yesterday, Carl Bildt, the civilian High Representative for
implementation of the Dayton peace plan, said through a spokesman that
he would like NATO to reconsider its current policy respecting the arrest
of war criminals. Significantly, Mr. Bildt suggested that a reversal of
IFOR's policy of de facto impunity would "stimulate the peace process in
Bosnia-Herzegovina to go in a normal direction." It is time, past time, to
change course.
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